## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

CYNTHIA JOHNSON, doing . Civil Action No. 1:18cv689

business as The Little Surf Shack,

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Plaintiff,

vs. . Alexandria, Virginia

January 18, 2019

ASHLY E. SANDS; INCOPRO, INC.,. 10:40 a.m.

a Delaware Corporation; and WOWWEE USA, INC.; a Delaware Corporation,

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Defendants.

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TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEONIE M. BRINKEMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: LANCE G. JOHNSON, ESQ.

Johnson Legal PLLC 12545 White Drive Fairfax, VA 22030

FOR DEFENDANT ASHLY E. EVE GRANDIS CAMPBELL, ESQ.

SANDS: O'Hagan Meyer PLLC

411 East Franklin Street

Suite 500

Richmond, VA 23219

FOR DEFENDANT INCOPRO, INC.: JAY W. BROWN, ESQ.

PAUL J. SAFIER, ESQ. Ballard Spahr LLP 1909 K Street, N.W.

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(APPEARANCES CONT'D. ON PAGE 2)

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COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES

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1	<u>APPEARANCES</u> : (Cont'd.)	
2	FOR DEFENDANT WOWWEE	CARTER T. KEENEY, ESQ.
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- because this is the -- I'm deeming those to be motions to dismiss the second amended complaint so there's no question about that.
- And I want to take up Ms. Sands' motion first because that's a motion addressing the issue, I think, primarily of personal jurisdiction. Mr. Johnson, I don't think you have personal jurisdiction over this defendant. My understanding, unless you have any other evidence, is that Ms. Sands is an attorney who is licensed and practices in New York. As far as I know from the record, she's had one case in the Eastern District of Virginia, and that was in Richmond, and I think she was pro hac in that case.
  - She's not admitted to practice in Virginia as far as we can tell from the record, and the only contacts that she's had related to this case were as a result of contacts initiated from the plaintiff on behalf of the plaintiff from Virginia into New York. It's not as if she was contacting you sua sponte.

Do you have any other evidence of personal contacts between Ms. Sands and this jurisdiction that would support personal jurisdiction?

MR. JOHNSON: As a point of clarification, Your Honor, the response e-mail was to Incopro. We didn't know Ms. Sands existed.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, okay.

MR. JOHNSON: Ms. Sands then called to Virginia.

That was the first contact I had with her -- or that the plaintiff had with her. I have no other information at this point about her contacts in Virginia. I know she's involved with an enforcement action for counterfeit Fingerlings products in Richmond. I do not know if that case arose out of this same complaint to Amazon.

I am somewhat reluctant to suggest that a pro hac admission would be sufficient, but at this point, without additional jurisdictional discovery, I have no additional facts. As I mentioned under the *Telco* case, there is some leeway about minimum contacts, but the further contact or the further touch in Virginia that was required by that case, at this point I do not have that evidence, and I would require jurisdictional discovery in order to find it.

THE COURT: Well, the Fourth Circuit has -- recently actually has a case where -- involving one of my cases, talks about the right of a plaintiff to take limited jurisdictional discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction. In the last case that I had involving that, where I was pretty satisfied based on the record that's before -- that was before me that there really was no basis to continue to pursue the issue, I did allow that plaintiff to have brief jurisdictional discovery. However, I warned the plaintiff, because I didn't think it really was going to pan out, that if at the end of the

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discovery they were unsuccessful in showing that there was any basis for personal jurisdiction, the costs which the defendant had to incur in that discovery would be -- have to be paid by the plaintiff, all right? In other words, basically it forces a plaintiff to think -- or plaintiff's counsel to think wisely about whether it's worth pursuing personal jurisdiction discovery. And so I'm going to impose that same ruling in this case; that is, the motion to dismiss for failure to establish personal jurisdiction within the complaint will be denied without prejudice. If the -- and I will allow the plaintiff brief jurisdictional discovery as to Ms. Sands. If you choose to go that route and you are unsuccessful in developing evidence that results in the Court finding personal jurisdiction, then the expense which Ms. Sands will have to incur in terms of, you know, having an attorney respond to discovery, etc., you and your client will have to cover. Do you understand that? MR. JOHNSON: I do. THE COURT: All right. MR. JOHNSON: And if agreed to a stipulation of dismissal now, I take it that would avoid that procedure --THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. JOHNSON: -- and Ms. Sands will be dismissed.

THE COURT: That is correct. So I'll give you that option as well, all right? All right.

Now, the other two motions that are pending before the Court both involve 12(b)(6) issues, and they also involve an interesting issue about litigation privilege. I've looked at those papers. I'm not satisfied on this early -- at this early point that either of them -- or any of those theories are sufficient to go forward at this point.

The plaintiff has made, in my view, a very strong preliminary allegation that the claim that the product the plaintiff is selling through Amazon is counterfeit has no factual basis and that Incopro did not conduct any kind of reasonable investigation that would support having made that kind of a representation to Amazon.

Although I read your papers and I know you tried to, to indicate that it was counterfeit or infringing, if you look at the totality, at least as I read them, of the information sent to Amazon, that word "counterfeit" is very strong. I think it's sufficient at this point to make a claim of defamation per se or defamation because when you allege that somebody's product is counterfeit, I mean, frankly, there are criminal statutes that sanction the selling of counterfeit goods.

That's a very serious statement to be made unless there's a genuine factual basis that supports that, and so I --

1 at this point, I'm not going to dismiss the claims.

This issue about, you know, that there was a privilege because these representations to Amazon were made in anticipation of litigation, again, I'd have to see what the evidence is before I would accept that argument.

So I'm going to require that these counts go forward, all three counts. The tortious interference with contract, there's no question that there's been serious interference between Ms. Johnson's business and Amazon as it's alleged in the complaint.

I, frankly, don't understand why this case hasn't settled, and I would be curious since you're all here to hear more specifically from the defendants what your -- I guess it should come from Incopro -- what the real theory is that -- of wrongdoing that you allege the plaintiff has done. In other words, what are you really claiming is the intellectual property violation that the plaintiff engaged in when she was selling these products on Amazon?

Yeah.

MR. SAFIER: Your Honor, my understanding is that at the end of the day, the accusation is one of copyright infringement.

THE COURT: I don't think it's that. The language says "counterfeit." That's the first word in that statement.

MR. SAFIER: Right. And what I was meaning to say

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was as -- if this case goes discovery, that's what it will
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     show.
               Now, what you have represented, which I think is
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     fair, is that the word "counterfeit" is sufficiently prominent
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     in the submission to Amazon that that argument doesn't carry
     the day at the 12(b)(6) stage, which I accept, but I think the
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     absent privilege argument, though, is we sent a demand to
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     Amazon and said to Amazon: There is infringing material on
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     your website. Take it down.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Tell me, what's the infringing
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     material?
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               MR. SAFIER: Well, we -- my understanding is what we
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     intended to convey was that it was copyright infringement, but
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     for purposes of the privilege, it doesn't matter. We were
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     saying to Amazon: We believe there is material on your website
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     that infringes our intellectual property. We are making a
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     demand that you take it down.
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               And Amazon, as a party subject to demand letter, made
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     a poor business decision that it would take down the content,
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     and that's exactly what the litigation privilege --
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               THE COURT: What is the copyright?
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               MR. SAFIER: I believe it's an image of the specific
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     WowWee toy at issue.
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               THE COURT: Does WowWee have a copyright of a
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     photograph?
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MR. SAFIER: I believe they own the copyright to that 1 2 image, yes. 3 THE COURT: You believe? I mean, do you know it as a 4 fact? 5 MR. SAFIER: That is my understanding of the facts, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: So they have -- and why do you believe 8 that it was the plaintiff that put that photograph up on 9 Amazon? 10 MR. SAFIER: We didn't assert anything as to whether 11 the plaintiff put it up or Amazon put it up. The demand letter 12 was to Amazon, and my point here is the absolute privilege --13 litigation privilege applies whether it's counterfeiting or 14 copyright. 15 What you do when you submit a demand letter to a website is you say: We think there's infringing content on 16 17 your website. Investigate it, and decide what to do. 18 Amazon did that, and what they decided to do was take 19 it down. 20 It would be no different than if, you know, we had sent a letter directly to Surf Shack and said: We think 21 22 there's infringing content on your website, and they took it 23 That would clearly fall within the litigation privilege, 24 and there's no difference here. It may feel different because 25 Amazon is this gigantic behemoth that feels this sort of, you

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know, feels like a third party here, but the demand and complaint was to Amazon about content on the Amazon website, and under Mansfield, the Virginia Supreme Court decision, that type of communication is subject to a litigation privilege if it is only distributed to an interested party, which is what happened here. THE COURT: Well, that may all down the road pan out, but I think without discovery and actually seeing is there, in fact, a copyright for this particular photograph or image that was on the website, I'm not prepared to dismiss these cases -this case at this point. MR. SAFIER: I appreciate that, Your Honor --THE COURT: Yeah. MR. SAFIER: -- but the privilege applies even if it's a counterfeiting complaint. Nothing about whether the privilege applies turns on the complaint we were making. THE COURT: Well, only if it's a good faith -- if it's a good faith, genuine basis for even claiming that there's potential litigation. And the other thing is, by the way, this issue was raised in Ms. Sands' motion but I don't think WowWee or Incopro raised it explicitly: There's an interesting issue as to what law is going to apply to this case. Our preliminary position is, is that most likely Washington law is more appropriate,

- although it's very similar to Virginia, but I think at some point down the road, we're going to have to be 100 percent in agreement as to what law is applying to this case.
- In any case, I don't understand why this case can't be settled. If, in fact, what I'm told from the complaint, the plaintiff is a legitimate business, who's not selling counterfeit goods, who goes to Walmart and other legitimate, you know, retailers and purchases these items and then offers them on Amazon as a secondary source of the items, as she's represented in her paperwork, why she's being penalized and not able to use Amazon to sell these goods I don't understand.
  - MR. SAFIER: Your Honor, that's Amazon's decision, though.
    - THE COURT: Well, it's Amazon's decision only -- the only problem is because you-all told Amazon that there was a problem with what the plaintiff's product was -- what was going on.
    - MR. SAFIER: But Amazon took our demand letter and investigated the situation and made a business decision about how to handle it. It's no different than any demand letter to anyone.
    - I appreciate that if we had sent the demand letter directly to Surf Shack, they would have probably told us to pound sand, and Amazon didn't do that, but that's up to Amazon.

      Amazon gets to make a decision about how it's going to handle

demand letters.

And if you look at the *Mansfield* decision, the reason the litigation privilege exists is to keep courts out of settlement negotiations over demand letters. Maybe Amazon made an unwise decision, maybe they were rash, but it's ultimately Amazon's decision about what to do with content on its website when it receives a demand letter.

8 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from you,
9 Mr. Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, as we mentioned in the papers, the pre-litigation communications privilege doesn't apply here. No litigation was ever filed asserting or enforcing even the copyright claim that Incopro asserts, certainly not the counterfeit claim.

In the Mansfield case, it was an actual pleading. It was a draft complaint sent to the potential defendant seeking settlement. It wasn't sent to a third party, and it's not entirely clear -- or it is clear at this point that the Amazon procedures for handling those complaints have nothing to do with litigation. There is no published proceedings. There are no published procedures for how to proceed.

You know, the representations are presumed to be accurate. They act on them accordingly in a summary proceeding, and it says if the guilty -- you know, the seller is presumed guilty and must fight to clear its name, and in

- 1 | this case, it required a request to Incopro to, you know,
- 2 retract the complaint, which they refused. There's no appeal
- 3 from that.

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That's not a litigation, Your Honor. None of the safeguards associated with litigation are found in the Amazon

proceeding, so pre-litigation privilege does not apply.

this case, if you-all can't settle it among yourselves, is that

it is appropriate for there to be discovery on these issues as

to, you know, what the basis was for filing this case in the

THE COURT: As I said, I think before we can resolve

- 11 first -- this complaint with Amazon in the first place, whether
- 12 there was ever any intent or plan to sue Amazon if they failed
- 13 to do it. I mean, I think that would be relevant to the
- 14 pre-litigation situation.
- And whether or not there is actually a real copyright
- 16 for this photograph, what the photograph was, was it, in fact,
- 17 | a violation, you know, I think what kind of investigation was
- done by Incopro, and to the extent that, you know, WowWee hires
- 19 Incopro to do this kind of work for them, I think under the
- 20 concepts of, you know, respondeat superior, there's enough at
- 21 this point, again, we're only at the pleading stage, to keep
- 22 WowWee in the case.
- 23 So I'm denying without prejudice the remaining
- defendants' motions to dismiss, and again, as to Ms. Sands, if
- 25 | you're going to take a voluntary dismissal, that's fine. If

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you choose to do the option to get discovery, then as I said,
you'll have to face the potential for costs if it's not
successful. All right?
          MR. JOHNSON: I understand that.
          THE COURT: All right.
          MR. JOHNSON: And if I might have a few minutes with
Ms. Campbell, I can probably resolve the Ms. Sands issue right
now.
          THE COURT: We'll need it in writing, so whatever.
          Now, Judge Buchanan is the magistrate judge who's
assigned to this case, and again, this is one where I think,
you know, you might want to sit down and see whether or not
both sides can work this case out early and quickly. I would
think that Ms. Johnson's main interest is to get back on Amazon
as quickly as possible and to, and to get this matter over
with, because litigation is expensive, and, and we will go
ahead and get a scheduling order issued to you today so that
that will get the discovery process started, because I don't
think one has been -- oh, yes, it is. You already have one.
          MR. JOHNSON: Yes. And we filed the 26(f) report.
          THE COURT: Right. That's right. So you're already
moving on that.
          So we will move quickly, but still it's a couple of
months before the final resolution of this case if you are
unable to settle, but I think in this type of a case,
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